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NOTES AND COMMENTS
discourage a second attempt by the same person.9 As stated by a
leading authority on criminal law :30
When a man is in the act of taking his own life there
seems to be little advantage in having the law say to him:
"You will be punished if you fail." ... What is done to him
will not tend to deter others because those bent on self-
destruction do not expect to be unsuccessful. It is doubtful
whether anything is gained by treating such conduct as a
crime.
LAWRENCE T. HAMMOND, JR.
Criminal Law-Homicide--Death Resulting More Than a Year and a
Day After Assault
In Commonwealth v. Ladd,' indictments for murder and man-
slaughter alleged that the defendant struck the victim on September
21, 1958, and that the victim died as a result of this assault on
November 1, 1959. The defendant moved to quash the indictments,
contending that at common law there could be no criminal responsi-
bility for a killing where the death ensued more than a year and a day
after the stroke.' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that these
motions to quash were properly overruled. The majority reasoned
that the common law "year and a day" rule was not part of the
definition of murder, but only a rule of evidence or procedure. After
determining that the rule was evidentiary in nature, the court asserted
that it was within the judicial province to abolish the rule in light
of the advancement of scientific medicine in determining cause of
death.3 Consequently, the majority held that the indictments were
not fatal and did properly charge the crimes of murder and man-
slaughter. A vehement dissent charged that the abolition of the
° See Larremore, supra note 23, at 331.
'
0
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 68 (1957).
1402 Pa. 164, 166 A.2d 501 (1960).
'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (Supp. 1960), does not define murder,
but merely divides murder into degrees and provides punishments. The
Pennsylvania courts have construed this absence of statutory definition as
giving murder its common law meaning. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa.
500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955); Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 365 Pa. 291, 74 A.2d
125 (1950).
"[W]e may change a common-law rule of evidence without being guilty
of judicial legislation, and abolish it when we are aware that modern con-
ditions have moved beyond it and left it sterile." Commonwealth v. Ladd,
402 Pa. 164, 175, 166 A.2d 501, 507 (1960).
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rule was unwarranted judicial legislation because the year and a day
rule was firmly imbedded in the common law definition of murder.
4
In order to determine the genesis of and the reasons for the year
and a day rule, an examination of its common law development is
necessary. At common law there were three methods of dealing with
murder and manslaughter,' and in each form of action death within
a year and a day after the stroke was an important element. One
method was the inquisition against deodands whereby an action was
brought to forfeit to the king the personal chattels used by the assail-
ant in making the assault.6 The rule applied in these cases was that
if the party assaulted did not die within a year and a day after the
assault there could be no forfeiture, for after that time it was con-
clusively presumed that death resulted from some other cause.
7
A second form of action was the appeals of death. This was a
private process for the punishment of public crimes where a private
subject accused another of some heinous crime.8 During the time
that appeals of death were allowed, the Statute of Gloucester'
was enacted. It provided that an appeal for murder should not be
abated if the victim died within a year and a day after the assault.
This statute was construed as requiring that the appeal be brought
within a year and a day after the completion of the felony by the
death of the victim."0 Thus construed, the statute seems to have
been a statute of limitations since it dealt with the time in which
"Id. at 201, 166 A.2d at 520.
For an excellent and detailed analysis of the three forms of common law
action dealing with murder and manslaughter, see Louisville, E. & St. L. R.R.
v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230 (1894). See also Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa.
164, 166 A.2d 501 (1960) ; Note, 19 CHI.-KENT L. Rav. 181 (1941).
' The personal chattels which were used by the assailant were forfeited
to the king "to be applied to pious uses, and distributed in alms by his high
almoner." 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 300 [hereinafter cited as BLACK-
STONE].
" "The law does not look upon such wound as the cause of a man's death
after which he lives so long." HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 75 (8th
Curwood ed. 1824) [hereinafter cited as HAWKINS].
'The appeal of death had its origin in the Germanic custom of allowing
a private pecuniary satisfaction called a "weregild" to be paid to the injured
party or his relatives. This private process continued in order to insure
infliction of punishment 'upon the offender, although the offenses were no
longer redeemable. 4 BLACKSTONE * 313. These appeals could be brought
prior to an indictment and if the defendant was acquitted he could not be
later tried in a public prosecution for the same offense. 4 BLACKSTONE * 315.
' 1278, 6 Edw. 1, c. 9. The appeal of death was abolished as a form of
action in England by statute in 1819. Act to Abolish Appeals, 1819, 59
Geo. 3, c. 46.
10 4 BLACKSTONE * 315.
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the private appeal might be initiated. However, through transition,
and perhaps misinterpretation, the year and a day limitation on the
right to prosecute an appeal became a substantial element of crim-
inal homicide."
The third form of action was the public prosecution in the name
of and on behalf of the king. With the advent of criminal juris-
diction in the King's Court it became well established that no one was
criminally responsible for a homicide if the victim lived beyond a
year and a day from the infliction of the fatal stroke. 2 The apparent
reason for the rule was the uncertainty of medical science in fixing
the cause of death due to the long lapse of time between injury and
death. 3
The firm establishment of this rule in the common law probably
explains its widespread adoption and application throughout this
country. With the exception of New York,'4 and now Pennsylvania,
all courts which have considered the question have held that the year
and a day rule must prevail.'" Eleven states have expressly adopted
the rule by legislative enactment.' 6 In states where there are statutes
" For discussions of this statute as -one of limitations and its transition
into an element of criminal homicide, see Notes, 19 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 181
(1941); 65 Dicx. L. RV. 166 (1961).
" Louisville, E. & St. L. R.R. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230 (1894) ; Common-
wealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 175, 166 A.2d 501, 507 (1960) (concurring
opinion); 4 BLACKSTONE * 197; 3 COKE, INsrrruTEs 47 (1817) [hereinafter
cited as COKE]; 10 HAsLsRy, LAws OF ENGLAND, Criminal Law § 1349
(3d ed. 1955); HAWKxNS 93. The reason for the extra day was stated by
Lord Coke: "[For] regularly the law makes no fraction of a day: and the
day was added, that there might be a whole year at least after the stroke." 3
COKE 53.
" Coke gave the reason for the rule: "[F]or if he die after that time, it
cannot be discerned, as the law presumes, whether he died of the stroke, or
poison ... or of a natural death; and in the case of life the rule of law ought
to be certain." 3 COKE 53. See also The King v. Dyson, [1908] 2 K.B. 454,
where the court held that if death did not ensue within a year and a day
after the injury was inflicted the death must be attributed to some other
cause than the blow.
"People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934); People v.
Legeri, 239 App. Div. 47, 266 N.Y. Supp. 86 (1933). The New York court
reasoned that the common law rule was abrogated by the New York statute
defining murder which omitted mention of the year and a day rule. The
omission was construed as legislative intent for its non-application. These
cases provoked widespread comment. Notes, 4 BROOKLYN L. REv. 86
(1934); 19 MINN. L. RFv. 240 (1935); 10 Wis. L. REv. 112 (1934).
" E.g., Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943); People
v. Corder, 306 Ill. 264, 137 N.E. 845 (1922); State v. Dailey, 191 Ind. 678,
134 N.E. 481 (1922); Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App.
1959). See generally Annot, 20 A.L.R. 1006 (1922).
" ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-458 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2210
1962]
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creating, but not defining, the crimes of murder and manslaughter
the year and a day rule has been held applicable with the aid of the
common law.' 7
Although the great weight of authority supports the application
and existence of the rule, there is a sharp conflict as to its nature.
The question resulting in this division of opinion is whether the rule
is one of evidence or procedure, or whether it is a substantive ele-
ment within the definition of murder. Those cases holding that the
rule is evidentiary in nature reason that no evidence is admissible to
show cause of death when a year and a day elapse between injury
and death." Those cases holding that the rule is substantive reason
that the rule is part of the definition of murder and unless death
occurs within a year and a day there is no crime charged." Perhaps
the best reasoned solution is found in the recent case of Elliott v.
Mills20 where the court termed the rule both substantive and evi-
dentiary, and suggested that in a criminal action death within a year
and a day must be both pleaded (by indictment) and proved.2
The majority in the Ladd case reasoned that merely classifying
the rule as evidentiary would serve as a sound basis for its abolition.
(1947) ; CAL. PENAL CODE § 194; CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-9 (1953) ;
DE. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 573 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4008 (1948);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 365 (Supp. 1960); MONT. IEV. CODES ANN.
§ 94-2509 (1947); NEv. IEv. STAT. tit. 16, § 200.100 (1957); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 12-27-27 (1959) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-30-7 (1953). See also
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-30-7.4 (Supp. 1960).
" E.g., State v. Dailey, 191 Ind. 678, 134 N.E. 981 (1922); State v.
Moore, 196 La. 617, 199 So. 611 (1940); Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d 104
(Okla. Crim. App. 1959).
" E.g., Louisville, E. & St. L. R.R. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230, 241 (1894)
(dictum); People v. Clark, 106 Cal. App. 2d 271, 235 P.2d 56 (1951) ; Head
v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943); State v. Huff, 11 Nev. 17
(1876). See also PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 605 (1957), where the author
in discussing the year and a day rule said: "Unless the death occurs within
this period after the wound . . . the law conclusively presumes that the loss
of life was due entirely to other causes and will not hear evidence to the
contrary."
" E.g., State v. Moore, 196 La. 617, 199 So. 661 (1940); People v.
Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 105, 191 N.E. 850, 852 (1934) (dictum); Hardin
v. State, 4 Tex. Cr. App. R. 335 (1878); State v. Spadoni, 137 Wash. 684,
243 Pac. 854 (1926). Indictment for murder omitting this essential element
of murder does not charge a crime. Alderson v. State, 196 Ind. 22, 145 N.E.
572 (1924).
"335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959).
" This reasoning seems to suggest that the rule is substantive because it
has the effect of incorporating the year and a day rule into the definition of




It should be noted that no other court classifying the rule as evi-
dentiary has abolished it.2 On the contrary, other courts have
reluctantly followed the rule, reasoning that its abolition is a matter
for the legislature."
In an early North Carolina case24 the court recognized and ap-
plied the rule in holding that an indictment which did not specify
when the victim died after receiving a wound was fatally defective.
The court reasoned that "if death did not take place within a year
and a day of the time of receiving the wound, the law draws the
conclusion that it was not the cause of death; and neither the court
nor jury can draw a contrary one."' 25  While this language ap-
parently treats the rule as evidentiary, Chief Justice Ruffin's opinion
in a later case26 seems to align North Carolina with those states
holding that the rule is part of the substantive definition of murder:
[I]t must appear on the bill that the day of the death, as laid,
is within a year and a day from that of the wounding. For,
if it is not so laid, the indictment does not charge murder,
as the law attributes the death, not happening within a year
and a day, to some other cause than the wounding.'
The early North Carolina cases recognized the year and a day
rule while passing on the sufficiency of indictments containing vague
language as to the time of death.2 The writer could not find that
the question of the applicability of the rule has ever been presented
in North Carolina when, on the facts, the death occurred more than
a year and a day after an assault. In all the North Carolina cases
discussing the rule, the question has been raised in connection with
the sufficiency of the indictment.
G.S. § 15-144, enacted in 1887, provides that indictments for
murder and manslaughter containing the allegations set out in the
statute will be sufficient.29 Conspicuously absent from the prescribed
22 See cases cited note 18 supra,.2 "[U]nder the present law there is no other alternative .... On the
question of the year and a day rule, our hands are tied." Elliott v. Mills,
335 P.2d 1104, 1114 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (concurring opinion).
'State v. Orrell, 12 N.C. 139 (1826).
2 Id. at 141.
State v. Shepherd, 30 N.C. 195 (1847).
71d. at 198. (Emphasis added.)
"State v. Haney, 67 N.C. 467 (1872); State v. Baker, 46 N.C. 267
(1854) ; State v. Shepherd, 30 N.C. 195 (1847) ;' State v. Orrell, 12 N.C. 139
(1826).' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-144 (i953).
19621
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allegations is the the requirement of an allegation that the death
occurred within a year and a day. In State v. Pate,30 decided
within a few years after the enactment of this statute, an indictment
for murder was drawn in the statutory form, alleging only that the
date of the murder was December 5, 1896. The evidence at the
trial showed that the victim was wounded on this date, but did not
die until some seventy hours thereafter. On appeal, the court held
that the indictment was drawn within the form prescribed by the
statute and was sufficient to charge murder, and that there was
satisfactory proof that death occurred within a year and day.
However, even though an indictment drawn in the form pre-
scribed by G.S. § 15-144 is sufficient, this does not have the effect of
removing death within a year and a day from among the essential
elements of homicide that must be proved to establish criminal
responsibility within the common law definition of murder. The
legislature has provided that the common law is in full force and effect
unless abrogated or repealed.3' G.S. § 14-17 merely divides murder
into degrees and provides the punishments therefor. 2 It does not
provide a new definition of murder but permits the definition to
remain as it was at common law. 3  Therefore, it seems clear
that the ancient year and a day rule remains in effect in North
Carolina today, except for the requirement that it be' alleged in the
indictment.
It is conceded that the majority in the Ladd case was motivated
by good practical reasoning when considering that the advancement
of medical science has rendered the year and a day rule obsolete.
However, the abolition of the rule by judicial determination is
questionable in view of its firm entrenchment in the common law and
widespread acceptance in this country. The better reasoned holding
appears in Elliott v. Mills3 4 where the Oklahoma court was faced
with essentially the same question as that presented in Ladd. The
court in Elliott refused to abolish the rule, reasoning that its aboli-
tion was a matter for the legislature.
Legal writers have termed the rule "a purely mechanical test""B
" 121 N.C. 659, 28 S.E. 354 (1897).
"1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1953).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953).
8 State v. Streeton, 231 N.C. 301, 56 S.E.2d 649 (1949); State v. Dalton,
178 N.C. 779, 101 S.E. 548 (1919).
"'335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959).
" PEKINS, op. cit. supra note 18, at 605.
[Vol. 40
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and an "arbitrary rule"3 6 and judicial opinions have joined in assail-
ing the rule as archaic.17 The cause of death can now be accurately
fixed by competent medical testimony, whereas at the time of the
rule's inception the cause of death after more than a year and a day
was speculative.3" It is a curious irony that medical science has
advanced to the point that it may prolong life for long periods and
yet this miraculous advance could very well serve to exonerate a
murderer by simply prolonging his victim's life.
It is submitted that the legislature should take notice of this
ancient rule in light of current day medical standards and enact legis-
lation abolishing it. Many forms of legislation have been discussed,3 9
but a positive repudiation of the rule would best serve the ends of
justice. The rights of the accused would still be adequately pro-
tected, since the prosecution would still have the burden of proving
causation beyond a reasonable doubt. A positive repudiation of the
rule would serve to leave the issue of cause of death to the triers of
fact, rather than to a legal presumption forged some seven hundred
years ago that has long outlived its merit, logic and basis.
CARTER G. MACKIE
Criminal Law-Split Sentence-Trial Judge in North Carolina Not
Permitted To Impose Sentence Active in Part and Suspended in Part
The first probation law was enacted in Massachusetts in 1878;1
since that time changes in the philosophy of criminal punishment
have resulted in widespread use by courts of the suspended sentence.
The exact frequency of use of this type sentence is difficult to ascer-
tain because adequate statistical information is not compiled in a
large majority of the states. Figures complied by the Federal
CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW OF CRimFEs 536 (6th ed. 1958).
Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943) (should be ad-
justed by the legislature to conform to medical standards) ; Elliott v. Mills,
335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (rule has run the "limit of its.
logic"); The King v. Dyson, [1908] 2 K.B. 454 (doubts present day merits.
of the rule).
8 See Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104, 1114 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959)
(concurring opinion), where it was pointed out that at the time of the formu-
lation of the rule, life expectancy was not more than thirty-four years, while
today, expectancy is about sixty-nine years. Also, at the time of the rule's
inception medical science was in its infancy.
"'Id. at 1115.
'Mass. Acts 1878, ch. 198. See generally BARNES & TEETERS, NEW
HoIzoNs IN CRIMINOLOGY 554 (3d ed. 1959).
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